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Congress' New IDEA In Special Education: 
Permitting A Private Right of Action Against 
State Agencies 
In sum, education provides the basic tools by which 
individuals might lead economically productive lives to 
the benefit of us all. We cannot ignore the significant 
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups 
are denied the means to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1981 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that 
public education is not a fundamental "right" granted to 
individuals by the Constitution despite the fact that denial 
of education to some extraordinary group of children may 
"pose an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection 
Clause. "2 Forty years earlier, the Court held that 
segregation of the races in public schools violated equal 
protection. When a state undertakes the task of educating 
its children, a right to education is created in those children 
which must be made available to all children on equal 
terms. 3 The long and arduous path of the 1960s civil rights 
movement sought for the distant dream of equality and 
fairness. In fruition of the movement's quest, federal laws 
were passed against intentional discrimination in work, 
1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981) (Brennan, J.); See also Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Warren, C.J.) ("Today, education is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . . . . [T]he 
great expenditures for education . . . demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
of education to our democratic society."). 
2. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221·22. 
3. Furthermore, the Court in Brown stated: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
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school, employment and other areas based on race or 
gender, thus vindicating "equal treatment" in America.4 
Federal legislation in the 1990s continues the equal 
rights movement in an effort to liberate public education, 
but directs exceptional attention to a single class of children 
at the expense of the majority. Congress requests "special 
treatment" for children historically denied fair and equal 
access to education because of their inequalities.5 Thus, 
even though "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' granted to 
individuals by the Constitution, n6 federal lawmakers have 
clothed it as a governmental "benefit" which cannot be 
denied to disabled children. The most recent federal 
legislation concerning special education, the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 7 arms the parents of 
disabled children with power to enforce special education 
through lawsuits against schools, school districts and states. 
IDEA also allows substantial remedies such as injunctive 
relief, damages, attorneys' fees and costs. Moreover, it takes 
the concept even further by heightening the responsibility of 
teachers and administrators in states where special 
4. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1983 & Supp. 1990)) (prohibiting 
discrimination based on race); Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 
86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1990 & Supp. 1991)) 
(prohibiting discrimination based on sex or blindness). 
5. The most recent fmdings of inequality are articulated thus: 
The Congress fmds that . . . (3) more than half of the children with 
disabilities in the United States do not receive appropriate educational 
services which would enable them to have full equality of opportunity; (4) 
one million of the children with disabilities in the United States are 
excluded entirely from the public school system and will not go through 
the educational process with their peers; (5) there are many children with 
disabilities throughout the United States participating in regular school 
programs whose disabilities prevent them from having a successful 
educational experience because their disabilities are undetected . . . . 
20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1990 & Supp. 1991) (listing Congressional fmdings and 
declarations concerning the status of handicapped children in the United States). 
6. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 u.s. 1, 35 (1973)). 
7. Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1400-1485 (1991)). Originally called the Education of the Handicapped Act 
Amendments of 1990, § 901 of the official session laws technically renamed the 
short title of the 1990 Act the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act." Id. § 
901(a), 104 Stat. at 1142 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) 
(1990)) ("Any other Act and any regulation which refers to the Education of the 
Handicapped Act shall be considered to refer to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act.). 
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educational programs to diagnose student's disabilities at an 
earlier age are underway.8 
Part I of this article will examine Congress' latest 
enactment of law on the subject and suggest its local 
impact. Part II discusses broadly the structure and 
interrelationship of federal, state, and local financing which 
make up the fiscal pie of public education. Part III 
discusses how federal law requires teachers and 
administrators to diagnose and educate disabled children. 
This part also explains how the newly added requirements 
expose administrators, and the administrative bodies which 
review their actions, to legal action. Part IV discusses the 
disabled child's right to sue for denial of an appropriate 
special education and the kinds of relief available. Finally, 
part V explains how new amendments to special education 
law hurt poorer school by making state agencies, once 
immune from suit, liable for money awards in lawsuits. 
II. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PuBLIC EDUCATION AT THE 
FEDERAL, STATE AND LoCAL LEVELS 
A. Administrative Bodies 
Public education is largely administered through state 
and federal administrative bodies varying in size, degree, 
and function. Federal agencies generally determine the na-
tional educational agenda in their administrative capacities. 
The U.S. Department of Education oversees and administers 
distribution of grant monies to state educational agencies. In 
addition, federal agencies require state and local school 
systems to comply with laws governing federal education 
assistance programs in order to continue receiving such 
monies.9 
States have regulatory agencies to oversee disbursement 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1991) ("a free appropriate public education will be 
available for all handicapped children between the ages of three and eighteen 
within the state .... "). 
9. See, e.g., id. § 2791 (1990) (providing financial assistance to state and local 
educational agencies to meet the special needs of such educationally deprived 
children at the preschool, elementary, and secondary levels under the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965); Id. § 1203 (1990) (authorizing the Secretary 
of Education to make grants to states to assist them in funding adult education 
programs, services and activities under the Adult Education Act of 1966). 
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of grant monies and monitor compliance with federal re-
quirements. 10 Often, the states promulgate rules of their 
own, independent of the federal agencies. Each state has its 
own particular administrative hierarchy. Typically, a state 
creates three entities or bodies-a state chief officer of ed-
ucation, a state board of education, and a state department 
of education.11 Each has its own function and area of de-
cision-making power. State boards generally debate policy, in 
contrast to state departments, which implement policy de-
cisions and deal with day-to-day ministerial tasks. 12 The 
state chief officer, often referred to as the Commissioner or 
Superintendent acts as the public figurehead, or "liaison offi-
cer" between the two.13 
These state agencies control the policies and rules gov-
erning administration of special education funds. They exer-
cise broad control ranging from advisory and planning ser-
vices, to regulatory and supervisory control over policy-
making and dispute resolution at lower levels.14 Additional-
ly, state agencies generally see that policies contained in 
federal legislation are implemented by helping in research, 
record-keeping and managerial assistance to regional and 
local education agencies. 15 
Local school districts are governmental entities created 
by the states to establish and manage public schools within 
their jurisdictions.16 Local school districts implement the 
policies, rules, and regulations set forth by the state agen-
cies. They perform quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
tasks.17 
B. Making the Pie at Three Levels 
The pocketbook of public education is not located in any 
10. Id. §§ 1413-1414 (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
11. 1 WIUJAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW, PuBLIC AND PRIVATE, § 3.2, at 35 
(1985 & Supp. 1989). 
12. Id. at 36. 
13. Id. § 3.4, at 37 ('The Commissioner "acts as the executive officer of the 
State Board of Education, ancVor chief administrative officer of the State Board of 
Education . . . . [He] exercise[s] quasi-legislative powers; and personally conduct[s] 
quasi-judicial review of school board decisions .... "). 
14. Id. § 3.3, at 36. 
15. !d. § 3.4, at 37. 
16. Id. § 3.7, at 39. 
17. Id. § 3.13, at 51. 
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Distribution of these funds to is limited by law to those 
local school districts which conscientiously ensure appropri-
ate public instruction. Hence, state and local governments 
must construct an administrative system wherein students 
can be heard in order to protect their entitlements as bene-
ficiaries of federal monies. 23 A state agency that fails to 
regulate public education risks being denied federal funding. 
Yet, rarely has any state been refused federal special educa-
tion funding for lack of agency supervision or failure to 
create procedural safeguards. Thus, the risk of losing federal 
funding is relatively low compared to the risk of losing 
funding from state appropriations or local revenues which 
may fluctuate. 
While states will argue these grants are not enough, 
the magnitude of these funds can be significant where pub-
lic education is under-funded. When the amount of monies 
sent to each state is based on the national average expen-
diture per pupil, states which spend less than that average 
will reap a greater benefit than states which spend more 
than the average.24 Even though the dollar-per-pupil sent 
to each state may be equal for every state, in the under-
funded states it will represent a larger portion of the funds 
available to pay for public education. In this respect, federal 
appropriations may loom large in the overall picture of 
fmancing public education. 
2. State appropriations 
The second source, state funds, is equally important in 
the scheme of public education finance. States are auton-
omous in how much or how little they choose to spend on 
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
24. See generally id. § 1411 (1990)(a) (stating the formula for determining 
maximum state entitlement). Concerning the amount of federal funds, it has been 
said: 
[The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975] established a 
payment formula based upon a gradually escalating percentage of the 
national average expenditure per public school child times the number of 
handicapped pupils receiving publicly fmanced special education and relat· 
ed services in each state. That percentage was scheduled to escalate on a 
yearly basis until 1982, when it was to become a permanent 40 percent 
for that year and all subsequent years. Yet, regardless of the dollars 
generated under this formula, they are potential dollars only. The entitle-
ments become reality only if Congress actually appropriates the money. 
JAMES A. SHRYBMAN, DUE PRocESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 24 (1982). 
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public education. These spending decisions are controlled by 
state legislatures which act under the specific mandates or 
prohibitions contained in states constitutions. 25 
As in the federal model, state budgets designate funds 
for education. This means that state revenues from income 
and sales taxes are the major sources. Pursuant to fiscal 
planning and estimates of operational expenses, local public 
schools are given a slice of the fiscal pie which funds all 
state operations. 26 When the governor presents his budget 
to the general assembly for approval, it includes a figure to 
be spent statewide to support and maintain construction 
projects, special programs, operational expenses, teachers 
salaries and the like. This represents the state's contribution 
to education to be distributed to local districts. 27 Budget 
funds offset cost increases due to growth, inflation, techno-
logical change, and other expenses local districts cannot 
raise from taxes nor afford on existing funds. In summary, 
state appropriations are subject to political controversy and, 
economic fluctuations. 
3. Local appropriations 
The third source, local funds, make up the greatest 
portion of funds to reach the public schools. it also repre-
sent the greatest tax burden on citizens. Local governments 
25. Most state constitutions mandate the legislature to establish, provide, and 
maintain a uniform system of free public schools. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; 
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; 
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CoNN. CaNST. art. IX, § 1; 
DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CaNST. art. IX, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO 
CaNST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CaNST. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. 
CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. art. XII, § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CaNST. art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; 
MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 
1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 
2; N.J. CaNST. art. IV, § 4, 'li 1; N.M. CaNST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 
1; N.C. CaNST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII., § 1; OHIO CaNST. art. VI, § 3; 
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; 
R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; 
TENN. CaNST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; 
VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CaNST. art. XII, § 1; 
WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. One state calls education a 
"primary obligation" of the state. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, 'li 1. Some states do 
not mandate but "encourage" education to be "cherished." IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d., 
§ 3; MAss. CONST. ch. V, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; VT. CaNST. ch. II, § 68. 
26. 2 VALENTE, supra note 11, § 20.11, at 281. 
27. Id. §§ 20.21-.22, at 282-89. 
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are responsible for establishing and maintaining local 
schools by virtue of the obligation delegated by the state. 
The power to raise revenues necessarily follows this obliga-
tion. Cities, municipalities and towns raise the bulk of their 
revenues from real and personal property taxes, excise tax-
es, value-added taxes, bonds, fees, and special charges. 28 
Typically, a state statute mandates that local school districts 
raise most of their operational funds through county proper-
ty taxes. 29 In some states, the constitution permits school 
districts to supplement these revenues by directly charging 
student fees. 30 
Notwithstanding these authorizations, the power to tax 
is limited. For example, a state constitution might declare 
that the power of a county to levy a tax on property may 
not exceed one-tenth of one-thousandth on the assessed val-
uation of the property in question unless voted on by the 
citizens. 31 Furthermore, a city or county may not tax state 
or federal property.32 At the far extreme, a state may in-
validate a property tax on the grounds that it taxes con-
trary to the limits of the state constitution. 33 
28. Id. §§ 20.23-.30, at 289-304. 
29. William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Con-
stitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 
1639, 1647 n.33 (1989) ("The exception is Hawaii where the state takes all state 
and local revenues and then distributes it to the local schools."). 
30. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(b) ("The legislature shall make suitable provi-
sion for finance of the educational interests of the state. No tuition shall be 
charged for attendance at any public school to pupils required by law to attend 
such school, except such fees or supplemental charges as may be authorized by 
law . . . ") (emphasis added); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Public elementary and 
secondary schools shall be free, except the Legislature may authorize the imposition 
of fees in the secondary schools.") (emphasis added); 1 VALENTE, supra note 11, § 
2.2, at 14. 
31. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LocAL GoVERNMENT IN 
A FEDERAL SYSTEM 19 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing Article 8, Section 10 of the Michi-
gan Constitution as cited in Oakland County Taxpayers' League v. Board of Super-
visors, 94 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. 1959)). 
32. 2 VALENTE, supra note 11, § 20.23, at 291 n.46. 
33. Robert F. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, in DEVELOP· 
MENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71, 72-73 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) 
(discussing Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 
Dickey v. Robinson (Robinson II), 414 U.S. 976 (1973)); Thro, supra note 29, at 
1653-56 (discussing Robinson, where the New Jersey Supreme Court found state 
system with two-thirds of school expenditures fmanced from local taxation contrary 
to the New Jersey Constitution). See also Levine v. Institution and Agencies Dept., 
418 A.2d 229 (N.J. 1980). 
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III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION GIVING SPECIAL TREATMENT TO 
DISABLED CHILDREN 
A. Mandating Compliance With Administrative Guidelines 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation became 
aware that millions of school age children with physical, 
mental, and emotional handicaps were routinely being ex-
cluded from public schools. Congress responded by enacting 
federal laws granting federal assistance to the states in an 
effort to promote better educational treatment of the handi-
capped and non-English speaking.34 The original Education 
of All Handicapped Children Act (EHA)35 did more than 
just encourage special education, it created a comprehensive 
statutory law ensuring that states receiving federal monies 
provide an education to all qualified handicapped children at 
no cost. Unlike prior legislation which only mandated that 
states receiving federal funds maintain a policy of educating 
handicapped children, the EHA requires that states seeking 
federal funds for special education have an approved plan 
meeting specified guidelines. As a result, states have en-
acted statutes to assure compliance with the guidelines of 
the Act.36 
34. Some of the earliest federal grant programs merely encouraged special 
education such as Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. 
L. 98-750, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966). Then such laws were amended by the Education 
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) requiring special educa-
tion. See generally LAURA F. RoTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 1-12 (1990). 
35. Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 
(1990 & 1991)). 
36. Thirty-nine states have passed legislation on special education. ALA. CODE 
§§ 16-39-1 to -12, 39A-1 to -3 (1975 & Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.30.180-.350 
(1962 & Supp. 1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761 to -766 (1991); ARK. CODE 
§§ 6-41-101 to -302 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56000-56875 
(West 1989 & Supp. 1991); CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 22-20-101 to -115 (West 1988 & 
Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 228.041-.051, .093 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-152, -1160 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 
301-21 to -28 (1985 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 33-2001 to -2009 (1981 & 
Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 14-1.01 to -15.01 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & 
Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-6-1 to -22 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1991); IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 281.1-.15 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
157.200-.290 (MichiEYBobbs-Merrill 1987 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
17:1941-:1958, :1971-:1979 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-
A, §§ 7001-7257, 7702-7805 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 71B, 
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Most litigation under the EHA does not question the 
adequacy of a state's statute authorizing federal funding but 
rather arises as an individual's challenge to a state's lack of 
compliance with EHA guidelines. 37 The EHA codified due 
process for parents challenging any alteration, denial, or 
exclusion of their handicapped child from state special edu-
cation.38 It also contains features giving a handicapped 
child a right to relief when due process has been vio-
lated.39 Relief includes injunctions such as a stay of edu-
cational placement during administrative proceedings, 40 or a 
reimbursement of private tuition while the proceedings are 
pending.41 
§§ 1-14 (Law. Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 380.1701-
.1766 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.03, .17-.18, .182 (West 
1960 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-23-1 to -517 (1990 & Supp. 1991); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 162.670-.999 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
20-7-401 to -463 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388.440-.520 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 22-13-5 to -8 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Enuc. LAw §§ 4401-4410 
(McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-59-01 to -10 (1981 & 
Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 13-101 to -129 (West 1989 & Supp. 
1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1371 to -1382 (1962 & Supp. 1991); Rl. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 16-24-1 to -17 (1988 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-33-10 to -100 
{Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 13-37-1 to -31 (1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 49-10-101 to -1001 (1990 & Supp. 1991); TEX. Enuc. ConE ANN. § 21.501-
.512 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-15-301 to -304 (1989 & 
Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2941-2973 (1989 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 21.1-213 to -221 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
28A.150.390, .155.010-.140 -160.030 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-
20-1 to -9 (1988 & Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. §§ 21-2-501 to -502, -21-101 to -104 
(1986 & Supp. 1991). Eleven states have comprehensive statutes implementing the 
EHA guidelines. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-76a to -76cc (West 1986 & Supp. 
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3101-3143 (1981 & Supp.1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 72-961 to -981 (1985 & Supp. 1990); MD. Enuc. CODE ANN. §§ 8-101, -301 to -
416 (1989 & Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-3301 to -3365 (1987 & Supp. 
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186-C:1 to -:28 (1989 & · Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 18A:46-1 to -43 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-106 
to -146.4 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3323.01-.17 (Anderson 1990 & Supp. 
1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 343-035 to -534 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.76-.89 
(West 1991 & Supp. 1991). 
37. A LEXIS search using the terms related to the EHA revealed that four-
rrl'ths of the reported cases dealt with a handicapped child's suit against an educa-
tional institution. 
38. See generally Note, Enforcing the Right to an •Appropriate• Education: The 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 
(1979). 
39. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-11 (1984) (observing that the EHA 
"establishes an elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handi-
capped children"). 
40. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1984). 
41. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 
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A. Definitions of Disabilities and the Interpretive Quagmire 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990 
(IDEA),42 requires "specially designed instruction, at no cost 
to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs43 of a 
child with a disability .... "44 Congress' new "IDEA" 
broadens the scope of disabilities to include, among others, 
children with serious emotional disturbance,45 traumatic 
brain injury,46 and specific learning disabilities.47 Further-
more, it permits elusive conditions such as attention deficit 
disorder, hyperactivity, and impulsivity to qualify as disabili-
ties under the catch-all category of "other health impaired 
conditions."48 
However, IDEA, despite its praiseworthy goal to help 
more students, magnifies problems facing teachers and ad-
ministrators who must prepare and plan special education 
programs. Teachers lack the specific technical training nec-
essary for special educational programs. Moreover, qualified 
special education instructors are overworked. Administrators 
who manage teachers find it increasingly difficult to hire 
qualified special education instructors on their budgets. 
Hence, increasing the number and type of disabled children 
that schools must educate increases teachers' workloads, 
thus aggravating deficiencies. 
According to government statistics, the year 1989 saw 
the largest increase in special education enrollments since 
1981.49 At the same time, state and local school districts 
(1985). 
42. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
43. H.R. REP. No. 410, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983), reprinted in 1983 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088, 2106 (clarifying that "the term 'unique education needs' be 
broadly construed to include the handicapped child's academic, social, health, 
emotional, communicative, physical and vocational needs."). 
44. 20 U.S.C. § 140l(a)(16) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
45. Id. §§ 1401(a)(1)(A), (a)(15). According to government figures, 3% of school 
age children suffer from the disabling condition of serious emotional disturbance. 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTII: 
PRoBLEMS AND SERVICES, A BACKGROUND PAPER 18 (1986). See generally 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.5(bX8Xi)-(ii) (1990). 
46. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(1)(A), (a)(15) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. § 1401(a)(1)(A). 
49. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TwELFTH ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TIIE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION OF TIIE HANDICAPPED ACT 20 (1989) (totalling 
new special education enrollments as 93,090 out of 4,500,000 current enrollees for 
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were experiencing a shortage of certified special education 
teachers. 50 Moreover, while more teachers can be hired, 
assuming school districts could afford them, current special 
education instructors will need continuing education to in-
struct them in finding, diagnosing, and treating newly pro-
tected disabilities. In addition, according to the Committee 
on Labor and Education, teachers must be educated, and in 
some cases retrained, to recognize the characteristics of "at-
tention disorder deficit" and will need training in the educa-
tional management of children with this disorder and stan-
dard medical and psychological treatments. 51 Not only will 
teachers need to be taught to recognize these disabilities, 
but their training will be ongoing as administrators must be 
ever aware of the constant changes in regulatory definitions. 
Increasing the number of disabilities deserving special 
treatment means teachers must sift through more rules and 
regulations. Schools cannot begin to understand which chil-
dren are "disabled" until state agencies publish regulations 
interpreting Congress' intent. School administrators must 
then read the regulatory agency's report about a particular 
disability-first in the Federal Register, a weekly govern-
ment publication, and later in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 52 Of course, any benefits from technical guidelines 
presupposes that administrators and teachers have access to 
those guidelines. The guidelines are published in volumes of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. However, this assumes the 
average classroom teacher or administrator can readily com-
prehend the mass of information provided. 
Federal regulations are technical in nature and often 
written in "legalese" rather than plain English. Few can 
unravel the Gordian knot federal agencies create in promul-
gating regulatory guidelines. For the most part, the average 
an abnormally high 2% rise). 
50. H.R. REP. No. 544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990) reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1742 (referring to the Twelfth Annual Report to Congress on 
Implementation of the Education of the Handicapped Act) 
I d. 
The same report indicates that 29,774 additional teachers were needed to 
fill vacancies and replace uncertified staff for students with dis-
abilities ... during the 1987-1988 school year. During the same time 
period, states reported needing 15,571 additional staff other than teachers, 
an increase of 27.1% over the number needed in 1986-87. 
51. Id. at 1728. 
52. See generally 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.754 (1990). 
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teacher or administrator may feel the need to ask a col-
league or legal counsellor for an opinion. 
To illustrate the point, the following is an official de-
scription of "serious emotional disturbance" as described in 
the regulations: 
I. [Attention deficit disorder] means a condition exhibiting 
one or more of the following characteristics over a long 
period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely 
affects educational performance: 
(a) an inability to learn which cannot be explained by 
intellectual, sensory or health factors; 
(b) an inability to build or maintain satisfactory inter-
personal relationships with peers or teachers; 
(c) inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under 
normal circumstances; 
(d) a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or de-
pression, or 
(e) a tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears 
associated with personal or school problems.53 
A child with an inexplicable inability to learn, not attri-
buted to mental or physical handicaps, may warrant some 
form of special education. A child who exhibits strange 
moods, fears, or who lacks interpersonal skills may repre-
sent the average school child suffering from problems the 
agency may find deserving of exceptional attention. Practi-
cally speaking, the teacher may not be able to distinguish 
"inappropriate behavior" meriting special treatment from 
common day-dreaming or inattention typical of many youth. 
Perhaps more frustrating, the department of education fur-
ther states that serious emotional disturbance "does not 
include children who are socially maladjusted. "54 The agen-
cy seems to want teachers to wade through yet another 
quagmire of interpretive rules to find a befuddling definition 
for "social maladjustment." In summary, the average teacher 
cannot reasonably be expected to discriminate among her 
students so as to make any sure determination of disability 
without the aid of a trained professional. Even then it is 
questionable whether the professional's determinations are 
53. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (b)(S) (1990). See also A.E. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 
25, 936 F.2d 472, 474 (lOth Cir. 1991) (denying parents' claim for a declaratory ac· 
tion that their child qualified as seriously emotionally disturbed). 
54. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (b)(8) (1990). 
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ad hoc, given the over-inclusive and vague definitions illus-
trated above. 
IV. A DISABLED CHILD'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
A. The Individualized Education Program and Procedural 
Safeguards 
Implementation of IDEA is based upon a specially for-
mulated "individualized education program" (IEP) developed 
by teachers in consultation with parents and social workers, 
nurses, or therapists who have contact with the child. Usu-
ally, the IEP is a written document 
prepared at meetings between a representative of the local 
school district, the child's teacher, the parents or guard-
ians, and, whenever appropriate, the disabled child. . . . 
[T]he IEP sets out the child's present educational perfor-
mance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for 
improvements in that performance, and describes the spe-
cially designed instruction and services that will enable 
the child to meet those objectives.55 
The IEP specifies both the desired goals for the child during 
the next school period for physical, mental, emotional and 
social growth, and prescribes the specific means to be em-
ployed to meet those goals. 56 
In addition, the IEP is the means by which a child's 
progress is recorded and monitored thus providing a written 
record which must be consulted before altering any current 
instructional plans or methods. 57 All discussions and sug-
gestions among professional educators and administrators 
regarding the child, along with parent-teacher conferences or 
other formal and informal proceedings, must be recorded in 
the IEP. Quite literally, the IEP is the "record" of the for-
mal proceedings between school administrators and parents 
upon which most of the administrative and judicial authori-
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1990 & Supp. 1991); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
311 (1988). 
56. See Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (lOth 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1685 (1991). 
57. Stephen W. Smith, Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) in Special 
Education-From Intent to Acquiescence, 56 EXCEPI'IONAL CHILDREN 6 (1990) (In 
the context of special education, the individualized education program is the sine 
qua non of the program. There is "no document more significant to districts, 
agencies, administrators, teachers, parents . . . and students" than the IEP.). 
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ties rely to resolve claims made by aggrieved parties that a 
right to a free, appropriate education has been violated. 
When a disagreement arises over a child's disability, 
current placement, program, or the like, the law provides a 
mechanism of resolution. Under the IDEA, states must es-
tablish administrative procedures and provide for a hearing 
by an independent officer. The hearing must be a final ad-
ministrative decision and findings made by hearing officers 
cannot be overruled by a state board. During the hearing 
the child must remain in her current placement68 unless 
she substantially threatens the health or safety of others. 
Parents must receive adequate notice of hearings and any 
change in their child's placement upon the decision rendered 
at the hearing's conclusion.59 Furthermore, the officer or 
board presiding at a hearing must reach a decision within a 
reasonable time period, usually within forty-five days, or 
else due process has been violated. 60 
These elaborate procedural safeguards are not free. 
Resorting to administrative proceedings imposes a economic 
cost not only on the parents but also on the state school 
districts that must provide them. These costs include pay-
ment to the hearing officer, the cost of tape-recording or 
transcribing the proceedings, and the cost of sending copies 
of the fact findings to the parents. 61 At the review level, 
the state agencies must cover the overhead to provide for a 
proper administrative review by a higher official or panel. 
Schools where funding is tight find themselves at a disad-
vantage when deciding to grant a parent's request for a new 
service or program. Some schools may fail to provide due 
process to a deserving parent simply because of to economic 
constraints. 
B. A Disabled Child's Right to Go to Court 
When Congress passed laws governing the administra-
58. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1990). 
59. See Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that a school board's consistent failure to provide notice to parents vio-
lates procedural safeguards under the EHA). 
60. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (explaining that Congress enacted 
the procedural safeguards in order to "guarantee parents . . . an opportunity for 
meaningful input into all decisions affecting their children's education."). 
61. RoTHSTEIN, supra note 34, at 184 (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 & 508 
(1990)). 
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tion of federal funds to encourage special education at the 
state level, it also enacted procedural safeguards to ensure 
state compliance. Specifically, parents of an improperly 
placed disabled child must exhaust their administrative 
remedies by first requesting an impartial hearing.62 If the 
parents are dissatisfied with the fmdings or decision of the 
hearing they must appeal to the state educational agency 
which makes impartial reviews of such hearings.63 Howev-
er, Congress afforded parents the right to bring a civil ac-
tion in state or federal district court in cases when no right 
to review by a state educational agency was available, 64 or 
when the final decision of such agency was allegedly erro-
neous and the parents had exhausted their administrative 
review options.65 By federal statute, a court may exercise 
judicial review over the records of the administrative pro-
ceedings of the aggrieved parents' claim and hear additional 
evidence presented in court. 66 More importantly, the court 
decides the parents' case based on a preponderance of the 
evidence and grants "such relief as the court determines 
appropriate . ..a7 
While the statute does not provide for a "damage" reme-
dy, 68 courts have been awarding the practical equivalent by 
compensating and vindicating the abused rights of disabled 
claimants under the EHA. "Damages" usually connotes mon-
ey awards which may be the appropriate remedy for a dis-
abled child denied rights under other federal statutes.69 
62. 20 u.s.c. § 1415(b)(2) (1990). 
63. Id. § 1415(c). 
64. Id. § 1415(eX2). 
65. Id. § 1415(e)(1). 
66. Id. § 1415(eX2). 
67. Id. 
68. Mark R. v. Bremen Community High Sch. Dist., 546 F. Supp. 1027 (D.C. 
Ill. 1982), a{fd, 705 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the EHA does not 
give a disabled child an action in tort for money damages for a school's willful 
failure to provide special education). 
69. The EHA is one of three federal statutes applicable in the areas of special 
education. The other two are section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Congress amended the EHA in 1986 so 
that the EHA no longer provides the exclusive avenue through which a parent may 
assert an EHA claim: 
(f) Effect on other laws. Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict 
or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Consti-
tution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. §§ 790 et seq.], 
or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of children and youth with 
disabilities . . . . 
49] PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 65 
The EHA and case law interpreting its provisions limit 
remedies available to a disabled child to injunctive relief0 
in the form of compensatory education or money awards in 
the form of tuition reimbursements,71 and, in most cases, 
attorneys' fees and costs. 72 
1. Compensatory education 
One form of "appropriate relief" parents may ask for is 
a court order requiring the state agency to place the dis-
abled child in an adequate special education program. This 
may also include an order requiring the state agency to pro-
vide a remedial curriculum to compensate for the learning 
the child lost "between the time the child entered into the 
challenged placement and the time the appropriate place-
ment began. "78 This form of relief is injunctive in nature 
and usually requires a showing that the disabled child has 
been harmed by the delay. 
2. Tuition reimbursements 
A second form of relief parents may ask for is actual 
reimbursement of money spent on private education when 
their child should have been receiving state-funded special 
education.74 This remedy is non-injunctive relief, similar to 
damages, which compensates for expenses reasonably related 
to the special needs of the child. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
However, the courts are split. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
subsequently stated that "[s]ection 504 . . . may be used as [a remedy] to enforce 
EHA educational rights, subject to the Act's existing exhaustion requirements.n 
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit denied that both Rehabilitation Act claims and EHA claims could 
be granted in the same case. Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
70. Geis v. Board of Educ., 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985) (school district ordered 
to continue private placement of handicapped child). 
71. Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1990) (school 
board required to pay for counseling services during which a child is subject to 
short·term medical hospitalization). 
72. Angela L. v. Pasadena lndep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(school board required to pay attorneys' fees for speech·impaired child). 
73. Mark H. Van Pelt, Comment, Compensatory Educational Seroices and the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act, 1984 WIS. L. REv. 1469, 1473. 
74. Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (tuition reimbursement awarded 
against school district). 
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3. Attorneys' fees and costs 
Not only are public entities liable for the full amount of 
these damage awards, but they must also pay for the other 
side's attorneys' fees and costs, where the court finds them 
appropriate. 76 The original federal legislation dealing with 
handicapped children had no provision for attorneys' fees. 
Despite the lack of an attorneys' fees provision, claimants 
under the EHA sought such fees by drawing upon other 
federal legislation in the civil rights context. When the Su-
preme Court put an end to this "backdoor" approach, 76 
Congress apparently changed its mind and added an attor-
neys' fees provision to the EHA.77 Currently, Congress has 
acted to expand attorneys' fees in other areas where a pri-
vate claimant seeks remedies for discrimination against a 
disability. 78 
Additionally, courts make it relatively easy for attorneys' 
fees to be awarded. Even a technical victory where the re-
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
76. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (denying attomeys' fees to handi-
capped claimant relying on such provisions in other federal legislation such as 20 
U.S.C. § 1988 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). 
77. Congressional sentiment after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. 
RobiTUJon was one of dissatisfaction and mild hostility. Proponents of the 1986 
amendments argued that low income families with handicapped children would not 
be able to pursue their rights to a decent education for their children. Yell and 
Espin, in their recent article dealing with the 1986 Amendments to the EHA, 
credit Senator Stafford as declaring "a law that mandates a free and appropriate 
education to handicapped children, that at the same time denies the awarding of 
legal fees incurred to uphold that mandate is a hollow promise at best and it 
hurts the families most, that can least afford it .... " Mitchell L. Yell & Chris-
tine A. Espin, The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986: Time to Pay the 
Piper? 56 EXCEPI'IONAL CHILDREN 396, 400 (1990) (quoting Senator Stafford during 
hearings on S. 415 before the subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Committee 
of Labor and Human Resources United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., May 
16, 1985). 
78. Supporting the trend is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which 
expressly gives the court or an agency discretion to award reasonable attomeys' 
fees to the prevailing party. Section 505 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1988 & 
Supp. 1991), states: 
I d. 
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this 
Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 
other than the United States, a reasonably attomey's fee, including litiga· 
tion expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the 
foregoing the same as a private individual. 
49] PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 67 
sult of the litigation is de minimis in nature does not pre-
vent a court from making the state pay.79 This is not to 
say that where the claimant has prevailed on the merits 
any sort of fees are permissible. The fees must be "reason-
able." But though the court may limit recovery to "reason-
able" attorneys' fees, it is not uncommon in some cases for 
fees to rise to stifling proportions. In cases where a handi-
capped party takes legal recourse to enforce special 
education-properly exhausting all administrative remedies 
and prevailing in a fmal judicial hearing-attorneys' fees 
may far exceed the initial tuition, transportation, and medi-
cal care at issue. For example, in one unreported case that 
was settled before trial, a federal district court in New York 
approved an attorney's fees award of $204,728, plus $105 
per hour for the subsequent time the attorney would spend 
in monitoring the decree.80 More troubling are situations 
where the fees themselves itself grossly exceed the damages 
awarded. In one case, a federal court in Delaware refused 
to reduce attorney's fees of approximately $78,000, even 
though the tuition and transportation relief at issue amount-
ed to only about $5,000.81 
In summary, under the EHA, an inadvertent procedural 
flaw or delay in the administrative process can result in a 
court ordering the reinstatement of a proper educational 
plan for the child and a substantial monetary award for 
tuition, attorneys' fees and costs. Even more disturbing is 
the IDEA's provision which authorizes courts to grant these 
awards against state entities previously considered immune 
under the Eleventh Amendment. 
79. See Angela L. v. Pasadena lndep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188 (1990) (parents 
of speech-impaired child were entitled to additional fees their counsel incurred as a 
result of school district's appeal); cf. Moore v. District of Columbia, 886 F.2d 335 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (EHA does not award attorneys' fees to parties who prevail in 
administrative proceedings in a judicial action solely to obtain fees for services 
rendered in those proceedings). 
80. Perry A. Zirkel, 'Backlash' Threatens Special Education, Eouc. WK., Aug. 1, 
1990, at 64. 
81. ld. 
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V. OVERTURNING DELMUTH V. MUTH AND EXPOSING THE 
STATES TO SmT 
A. Removing the Barriers of Sovereign Immunity 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity dates back to the 
old English common law belief that "the king can do no 
wrong." Simply put, it means that a citizen cannot sue the 
government because the entity that upholds the laws cannot 
violate the laws. 82 American courts have articulated this 
rationale in various cases supporting decisions barring suits 
for injunctions and damages. Suits seeking to force the 
federal government to specifically perform or cease doing 
some action are dismissed since they threaten to impermis-
sible stop the government in its tracks.83 Furthermore, the 
Eleventh Amendment has long prevented suits against 
states for money damages where such awards were to be 
paid from public funds in the treasury. 84 
However, states can be sued despite sovereign immuni-
ty. Most states have changed their law in recognition of 
their responsibility to compensate injured parties when 
states are at fault.85 Generally, the umbrella of sovereign 
immunity covers states and their subdivisions involved in 
policy-making. This includes agencies, departments, boards, 
special districts, and commissions. Local governments such 
as cities, municipalities, school districts, and towns are gen-
erally outside the umbrella.86 Counties are also considered 
an "arm of the state" but depending upon the powers they 
have been granted from state law, they may be more affili-
ated with local government and thus open to suit.87 
82. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.) ("A sover· 
eign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of an obsolete 
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as 
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."). 
83. Larson v. Domestic Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (Vinson, J.) ("The 
Government, as representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in 
its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract 
right."). 
84. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1973). 
85. 2 VALENTE, supra note 11, § 19.27, at 218-21. 
86. BE'ITY VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILI1Y AND RISK MANAGEMENf FOR 
PuBUC AND PRIVATE ENrmES § 4.233, at 202 (1990); 2 VALENTE supra note 11, at 
§ 19.29, at 224- 28. 
87. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1976) (fmding 
the board not entitled to 11th Amendment immunity under Ohio law because "(o]n 
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Federal law can take away the states' sovereign immu-
nity. Federal law protecting the rights of the people is the 
supreme law of the land. Thus, acting pursuant to Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the 
states' immunity despite the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment where it clearly expresses its intent to do so.88 
In the IDEA, Congress unequivocally says any state can be 
sued under the EHA by a disabled child denied due process 
in special education. Title 20, Section 1403 now reads: 
(a) A State shall not be immune under the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from 
suit in Federal court for a violation of this chapter. 
(b) In a suit against a State for a violation of this chap-
ter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equi-
ty) are available for such a violation to the same extent as 
such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit 
against any public entity other than a State.89 
This law is Congress' response to the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Delmuth v. Muth90 which refused to open 
the states to suit. There, the Court did not believe Congress 
intended to grant an enforceable right to education to chil-
dren with handicaps, despite states being logical defendants 
for due process violations in special education administra-
tion. Congress had not made "unmistakably clear" in the 
statute itself that states must answer in lawsuits.91 Con-
gress answered Delmuth quickly with a new law-states and 
balance the record before us indicates that a local school board such as petitioner 
is more like a county or city that it is like an arm of the State"). 
88. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a)-(b) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
90. 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (5-4) (denying relief against State of Pennsylvania 
under the EHA for due process violations). 
91. The Court's majority opinion explained: 
We recognize that the EHA's frequent reference to the States, and its 
delineation of the States' important role in securing an appropriate educa-
tion for handicapped children, make the States, along with local agencies, 
logical defendants in suits alleging violations of the EHA. This statutory 
structure lends force to the inference that the States were intended to be 
subject to damages actions for violations of the EHA. But such a permis-
sible inference, whatever its logical force, would remain just that: a per-
missible inference. It would not be the unequivocal declaration which, we 
reaffll'Dl. today, is necessary before we will determine that Congress in-
tended to exercise its powers of abrogation. 
Id. at 232. 
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their subdivisions. can be sued under the EHA. 92 
Unfortunately, the legislative history behind Section 
1403 fails to explain the effect this abrogation of immunity 
will have upon each states' own statutory scheme of govern-
mental immunity. 93 In fact, the language of Section 1403 
itself may make each states' particular statute dealing with 
immunity determinative of a state agencies' liability under 
the IDEA.94 
To illustrate, assume the following hypothetical: 
Johnny Doe is twelve years old. He attends A, a public 
secondary school, within B, a local school district, regulat-
ed by C, the state board of education, located in state X. 
Currently, A's administration has developed an IEP for 
Johnny which includes treatment for attention disorders. 
After Johnny's parents try to convince A to modify his 
IEP, they request a formal hearing before B challenging 
A's failure to provide adequate treatment. B concurs in A's 
findings. Disappointed by B's findings that Johnny's IEP is 
adequate, Johnny's parents place him in a private facility 
and request a review of B's decision by C. More than one 
year after the original hearing, and without g1vmg 
Johnny's parents notice of its action, C determines B's 
findings were not erroneous and decides against Johnny's 
parents. Johnny's parents file a lawsuit in federal court 
against B and C for violations under the IDEA, seeking 
injunctive relief, reimbursement of the tuition paid for 
private education, and attorneys' fees and costs. The court 
reviews the administrative proceedings below and finds B 
failed to abide by the proper procedures required by law. 
92. H.R. REP. No. 544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1734 wherein the House Committee on Labor and Education 
declared the following: 
!d. 
On June 15, 1989, the Supreme Court, in a 5·4 decision (Delmuth v. 
Muth) held that children with disabilities who are denied a free appropri· 
ate education by any State are not entitled to be reimbursed for tuition 
paid by their parents for placement in an appropriate program. The Com-
mittee has determined that the Supreme Court misinterpreted Congressio-
nal intent. Such a gap in coverage was never intended. It would be ineq-
uitable for the EHA to mandate State compliance with its provisions and 
yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal courts when 
State or State agency actions are at issue. 
93. !d. 
94. For a comprehensive list of governmental immunity statutes in the 50 
states and the District of Columbia see Table 4.1 VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 86, 
§ 4.2, at 178-96; See also 2 VALENTE supra note 11, at § 19.28, at 224 n.100. 
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Furthermore, it finds that C's one year delay aggravated 
the due process violation. Judgment is entered against B 
and C jointly and severally for the amount of Johnny's 
tuition at the private facility and for his attorneys' fees 
and costs in connection with the action. 
71 
Prior to the IDEA, C would not be liable for any 
amount of the judgment since it could invoke the Eleventh 
Amendment in its defense. B would be responsible for the 
harm caused by the due process violation. However, C will 
be exposed to suit to the same extent as any other "public 
entity" in state X since C is arguably an "arm of the state" 
subject to Title 20, Section 1403. Thus, C is responsible for 
its share of the judgment if state X has waived sovereign 
immunity for governmental functions such as administrative 
review by state agencies. 95 Generally, this inquiry comes 
down to whether C' s conduct is discretionary or ministeri-
al.96 If the former, C is immune; if the latter, C is liable. 
Assuming that state X considers failure to give adequate 
notice of proceedings to be a ministerial function, C will be 
liable for a due process violation. Johnny's parents will be 
able to enforce all of the judgment against C, and most 
likely C will sue B for contribution. Thus, B will pay less 
than it would have paid prior to Section 1403's enactment. 
In essence, one effect of the IDEA is to open up state X's 
coffers to compensatory damage awards, such as tuition 
reimbursements and attorneys' fees, for due process viola-
tions by its agencies. 
B. The Effect of Court Awards on Poorer Schools 
Adverse damage awards will help protect handicapped 
children against due process violations in administrative 
proceedings by deterring improper state action. A court that 
grants a substantial damage award along with attorneys' 
fees and costs against the state sends a strong signal to the 
state comptroller to correct the administrative review pro-
cess. While on the surface this seems a step towards im-
proving the quality and availability of an equal education to 
the disabled, the cost to the public education system may 
have as yet unrecognized adverse effects. 
95. VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 86, §§ 4.13·.133, at 162-78. 
96. Id. 
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Permitting a private right of action for damages against 
states and state agencies necessarily imposes an economic 
cost to local public education which hurts the schools least 
able to afford it. Since Congress has permitted greater ac-
cess to the courts and greater liability for defendants, it is 
not unlikely that more parents whose disabled children have 
been shorted in administrative proceedings will bring suit. 
As suits increase, the number of awards will increase. Pay-
ment of these awards will take a bite out of the slice of the 
governor's pie earmarked for education. Less state monies 
will reach the local school districts unless higher taxes 
make the pie grow, or lobbyists for state education get the 
governor to cut the local districts a bigger slice of the same 
pie. Thus, poorer local districts will suffer from the inability 
to raise more taxes to make up for reduced state assistance. 
Wealthier districts can compensate for lower state appropria-
tions by increased local taxation or private contributions. 97 
Unfortunately, poorer districts lack these resources.98 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The responsibility for public education in this nation 
primarily rests on state governments and their subdivisions. 
Funding for the many aspects of public education relies 
upon government subsidies and contributions from the pri-
vate sector. Government assistance keeps public education 
running in states by distributing public funds from federal, 
state, and local sources. In order to receive funds for special 
education, states must abide by administrative guidelines 
protecting the due process rights of school-aged handicapped 
children. These guidelines, along with administrative regula-
tions, permit a handicapped child to challenge his individu-
alized educational plan in a hearing and require each state 
to abide by procedural safeguards in any and all such pro-
ceedings. Additionally, proceedings are subject to judicial re-
view in federal or state courts. Beyond injunctive relief, 
courts can grant monetary awards such as tuition reim-
97. Thro, supra note 29, at 1647 ("Because a local school district that includes 
areas with predominately high property values can typically raise more revenue 
from property taxes than a district with predominately low property values, wealth 
effectively determines the level of funding for the local schools."). 
98. Id. at 1648. 
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bursements and attorneys' fees and costs. Congress' latest 
action now permits these awards against state agencies 
themselves by abrogating sovereign immunity under the 
IDEA. Each state's governmental immunity legislation will 
determine to what extent compensatory awards will reduce 
state funds due to the immunity or liability of state agen-
cies reviewing claims brought under the IDEA and its pre-
decessors. 
Words expressed by the nation's highest court nearly 
forty years ago still ring true in our day-"Today, education 
is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.1099 Private suits by disabled children econom-
ically threaten this vital function. These institutions live or 
die not so much by those funds sent from Washington, D.C, 
but rather according to the yearly appropriations decided by 
governors and state legislators. Awarding damages and 
attorneys' fees against state agencies reduces state funding 
of local schools by taking state revenues earmarked toward 
education and applying them towards the budgets of state 
administrative agencies to cover increased costs in paying 
off adverse judgments. Moreover, poorer school districts have 
less resources available to compensate for reduced state 
assistance. Notwithstanding IDEA's worthy purpose of 
meeting the educational needs of millions of handicapped 
children, the public needs to ask itself a gnawing question. 
Is it better for the needs of the few to be met at the ex-
pense of the many? 
Christopher Dean Greenwood 
99. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
